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"Military logistics is a vast enterprise costing
many billions of dollars annually. There are many ways of
carrying out these activities - various combinations of
spares, buffer stocks, depot repair, data processing, main-
tenance procedures, procurement practices, and so on.
The purpose of this study is to trace the develop-
ment of the Navy ' s repair part system and to explore a tech-
nique for determining the military essentiality of repair
parts, and using these data as one of the parameters for the
establishment of allowance lists and/or load lists. It is
not the intention of this study to develop a super-
sophisticated process, but rather to review present systems,
study research presently in progress and submit a program
with emphasis on practicality.
The age-old riddle of how much of what material will
be required, where and when, must be answered with known
precision. Intuitive-type decisions in the field of logis-
tics cannot be afforded nor relied upon in present times.
Timely logistic support is a necessity, but fleet readiness
must live with restraints imposed by space, size and weight
of the part, cruise length and budget. Accuracy and
^Hitch, C.J. and McKean, R. N., The Economics of
Defense in the Nuclear Age , Harvard University Press, 1960
flexibility are paramount and "readiness" is the sole pay-
off o
One of the major problems in the development of
optimum military inventory control systems has been the
need for a measure of the relative importance of supplying
one item instead of another. It is generally recognized
that some items are more important than others, but no way
objectively of measuring and comparing the military essenti-
ality of each item has explicitly been used in invento.vy
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control computations.
Military essentiality is concerned with measuring
the effects of parts failures on the capability of fighting
units in executing their assigned missions.
This study is approached from the standpoint of a
Navy-wide effort. In addition, compatibility of operating
goals with practical fleet application are observed care-
fully in detail.
The diverse background of the members contributing
to this research and study is considered an asset. The
study will serve as a compilation of work in the subject
area. It is hoped that it will contribute an unbiased
evaluation of an operations research approach to allowance?
list problems, with emphasis on military essentiality inputs
;
o
Polaris: The Optimum COSAL Program . The George




THE HISTORY OP NAVAL REPAIR PARTS SYSTEMS
The Background of Naval Logistics
Logistics, according to the Dictionary of United
States Military Terms for Joint Usage , consist of
those aspects of military operations which deal
with: (1) design and development, acquisition,
storage, movement, distribution, maintenance,
evacuation, and disposition of material; (2)
movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of per-
sonnel; (3) acquisition or construction, main-
tenance, operation, and disposition of facilities;
and (4) acquisition or furnishing of services.
It comprises both planning, including determina-
tion of requirements, and implementation.
Navy logistics is primarily concerned with the support of
weapons with which the blows of maritime strategy are struck.
In this age of space exploration and air attacks, of missiles
and nuclear weapons, there are some who consider the role of
the Navy to be shrinking. As long as water-borne weapons
platforms are required navies will exist. As long as the
tactics of war and deterrence require the movement of vast
quantities of materials and men, the seas will be used as a
medium of travel. As long as navies exist there will be a
need for improvement in their logistic support.
The sailing ships of Nelson's day were much more
capable of casting off their dependence on land support than
were World War II battleships. The increasing dependence of
3
ships on fossile fuels limited their ability to spend long
periods away from land and increased the need for logistic
Planning and facilities. As ship designs improved and
logistic facilities became waterborne, and therefore more
mobile, the requirement for far-flung coaling stations de-
creased and navies once again became more dependent upon
home-ports within the confines of their national boundaries.
During World War II the United States Navy was able to keep
the carrier task force of the Fifth Fleet at sea for seventy-
nine days through transfer-at-sea replenishment. This tre-
mendous accomplishment had not been anticipated nor even
thought possible at the beginning of hostilities. It was a
plan developed to fit the needs of the times. This and othc]
World War II experiences formed a firm foundation for the
current operational doctrines of the Sixth Fleet in the
Mediterranean. The effort that is required to keep this
fleet mobile has advanced navy logistics to a position never
before obtained. The development of navy logistics planning
has only begun, however. The advent of nuclear propulsion
has opened the way for less dependence on vast quantities of
fuel and the required shipping to furnish it, but has in-
creased the requirement for further improvements in every
other area of logistic support. This paper is directed to-
ward one small but extremely important element of navy
logistics planning— the supplying of materials needed to
repair the equipments that are required to make today '
s
ship an effective, mobile man-of-war.
The Growth of Naval Repair Parts Systems
The first war canoe probably left the banks of some
navigable river without a spare oar, but one can be sure
that each occupant had a spare weapon or a primitive plan
for obtaining one. As ships became larger and the appreci-
ation of their usefulness as battle platforms increased,
consideration had to be given to keeping them afloat and
keeping them mobile. The need for repair parts had arisen.
The captain of t"-.e sailing ship was able to solve most of
his repair part 3 problems by signing on carpenters, sail-
makers and blacksmiths and providing them with a few tools
and materials with which to ply their trade. The introduc-
tion of the iron clad, steam propelled ships in the late
nineteenth century intensified the problems of naval logis-
tics. As is often the case, technological development
quickly outstripped logistic support capabilities. "Repair
(hull) and machinery repairs beyond the power of the ship to
perform for itself were now necessary."*- The emphasis on
such elements of logistics planning as the supply of coal
and providing a network of repair facilities throughout the
world is evident from the writings of the naval logistic
planners and strategists of those times.
Benjamin H. Williams, Emergency Management of the
National Economy (Volume XIV; Distribution Logistics; In-
dustrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D. C,
1955), p. 25.
Mahan, speaking to the War College in 1888, listed
the secondary matters connected with the main-
tenance of warlike operations at sea" among the
neglected subjects of naval science. "It would
be amusing, were it not painful, " he said, "to
see our eagerness to have fast ships, and our
indifference to supplying them with coal . " In
1890, "looking forward" Mahan found our Atlantic
shores and the Caribbean dotted with British
bases, while we had not on the Gulf of Mexico
"even the beginning of a navy yard which could
serve as the base of our operations." In the
Pacific it should be the "inviolable resolution
of our national policy" that no European state
should acquire a coaling station within three
thousand miles of San Francisco. "For fuel is
the life of modern naval war; it is the food of
the ship; without it the modern monsters of the
deep die of inanition. Around it, therefore,
cluster some of the most important considerations
of naval strategy.
This emphasis on the broader aspects of naval logis-
tics has continued to today. Repair parts were considered
part of the fuel and repair problem. During this period
they were not neglected but neither were they considered on
a basis of total ship or total navy requirement. Those
repair parts that were required for the ship's propulsion
machinery were controlled by the technical bureau that was
responsible for the machinery. Likewise, those repair parts
that were required for the repair of ordnance equipments
were under the inventory control of that technical bureau.
Before and during World War II, each technical bureau built
up its own system for supplying repair parts to ships. In
2 Ibid
general, these systems resembled each other in that the re-
pair parts were procured with the equipments and provided to
the ships in sets designed to provide maintenance support for
one equipment. They were packaged in metal boxes which could,
theoretically, be stored conveniently near the pertinent
equipment. The experiences of World War II brought atten-
tion to the problems raised by this method of repair parts
support. This attention led to an evaluation of the assign-
ment of responsibility for repair parts support. The three
basic considerations in repair parts support are, as with
most areas of logistic support, what is needed, where it is
needed, and how to get it there. The decisions as to what
is needed and where, were, as indicated, the responsibility
of the cognizant technical bureau. The decision as to how
to get it there was a "supply" task but the responsibility
for this function was divided between the Bureau of Supplies
and Accounts and the technical bureaus. The weaknesses of
the independent systems were manifold. Differences in re-
placement procedures, duplication of stocks, poor identifi-
cation of items, lack of centralized inventory control and
variations in procurement and stocking policies resulted in
a. waste of material, money and personnel.
The disadvantages of such a situation as existed
at the end of World War II should be manifest. The
user had to employ different procedures in trying to
obtain items under the different independent systems.
Duplication of the more common technical items, roller
bearings to mention only one, existed in large numbers
8in the several systems. This tied up capital need-
lessly in duplicated inventories, This situation
led to shortages of items in one system with ex-
cesses of the same item or itams in other systems,
while few means existed for exchanging information
on stock availability among the systems. 3
The Integrated Navy Supply System
On February 14, 1947, the Secretary of the Navy,
James Forrestal, approved the "Integrated" Navy Supply Sys-
tem. This system was conceived to eliminate many of the
duplications of the World War II systems, to standardize
procedures and to centralize control. All supply tasks wero
to be centralized under the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.
The primary responsibility for determination of requirements
would remain with the cognizant technical bureau. These
determinations would be based on technical evaluation, re-
quests of the operating forces and inventory management con-
siderations. The plan as finally approved was a compromise
and, as experience has since shown, did not accomplish the
improvements originally envisioned.
The new Navy Supply System provided that control
of the major end items of equipment — these being
the expensive, infrequently-issued items such as
guns, air frames, or large engines — would remain
in the hands of the cognizant technical bureaus. It
provided that control of equipments smaller than
"major end items," repair parts and consumables,
would be vested in an office, which would control
one broad category of material, such as ships parts,
ordnance repair parts, aviation parts or provisions,
of the Navy's total inventory. This office would
act as an inventory control point. The new system
-'U.S., Navy Department, Bureau of Supplies and Ac-
counts, Supply Support of the Navy
,
(NAVSANDA Publication
340; 15 September 1957), p. 17.
effected a "marriage" of the technical and supply
functions at the inventory control point. The
inventory control point was directed to look to the
parent technical bureau for guidance in technical
matters pertaining to its particular material area,
and to the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts for
guidance relating to the performance of its supply
functions.
These "inventory control points" became known as
Supply Demand Control Points (SDCP) . For the purposes of
this paper we are interested in the SDCPs established for
the control of repair parts and the progress they made to-
ward increasing the effectiveness of the Navy's logistic
support capability for these items. In order to trace this
progress briefly and still maintain continuity in our pres-
entation we concentrate first on the shore establishment —
the bureaus of the Navy Department, SDCPs, supply depots and
major repair facilities — and then return to improvements
that have been made in the repair parts inventory control
procedures aboard ships.
The Integrated Navy Supply System retained the in-
dependent repair parts systems that had been established by
the technical bureaus. An SDCP was established for each
major category of repair parts — ordnance, ships machinery,
electronics, aviation. In addition an SDCP was established
for control of submarine and aviation repair parts on the
basis of their specialized nature and the critical effect
^hj.S., Navy Department, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, Supply Support of the Navy (NAVSANDA Publication
340; 15 September 1957), p. 18.
10
these parts had on the mission of these craft. 5 The first
big problem faced by the new supply system was to eliminate
duplication. Thousands of items had been procured for Navy
inventories during World War II. These items were identified
by manufacturer's part number and had to be identified and
catalogued in such a manner as to be easily ordered by the
user and more readily controllable by the inventory control
point. Items were identified, assigned a Standard Navy
Stock Number (SNSN) and grouped by like category and by
"cognizant symbol, " which identified the SDCP or inventory
control point that was assigned responsibility for inventory
control. This process eliminated much of the duplication
within each repair parts system. There were still parts
needed for equipments supported by one system — ordnance
for example — which were also needed for support of another
group of equipments controlled by another SDCP. This was
particularly true in the case of "electronics, " an equip-
ment category that was rapidly being applied to all areas
of ship control. Inventory control assignments were, there-
fore, revised on a "Program Support" and "Supply Support"
concept. Under Program Support an SDCP was assigned the
responsibility for assuring that all items of repair parts
required for the maintenance of a particular equipment or
group of equipments were available in the supply system.
5 This was, in effect, formal recognition of the
greater military worth of one type of "repair part as com-
pared to another.
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This SDCP did not necessarily have the inventory control
responsibility for all of these items. Items were cate-
gorized into "parts peculiar" and "parts common." The
Program Support SDCP was responsible for accepting the in-
ventory control responsibility for a "part peculiar," a
part used only in an equipment for which it had support
responsibility. The Program Support SDCP would request the
SDCP that had "supply support" responsibility to maintain
an adequate supply of the "parts common" — parts that were
needed to repair many different types of equipments. Al-
though there were some "holidays" in repair parts support
as the result of this new concept, much duplication of in-
ventories in the ashore supply depots was eliminated.
Cognizant symbols of many repair parts were changed to indi-
cate the change in inventory control assignments and the
repair parts now needed to support any one piece of equipment
might well be under the inventory control of three or four
SDCPS.
/
It has been estimated reputably that there were
two and one-half million items in the Navy Supply
System in 1947. Today (30 June 1957) there are only
a little under 1,200,000 items this reduction
in the number of items in the System was achieved in
a period when literally thousands of new items con-
tinued to enter the System each month as a result of
the adoption of new and more complex equipments.
6
The Program Support and Supply Support concept contributed
substantially to this reduction in inventory.
^U.S., Navy Department, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, Supply Support of the Navy (NAVSANDA Publication
340; 15 September 1957), p. 27.
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Another example of the use of these two assign-
ments is that of the recent assignment to the Electronic?:
Supply office of "Supply Support" of all "common"
electronics parts. This means that any SDCP receiv-
ing "Program Support" for an equipment will now know
that for all electronics parts listed as being "common"
that "Supply Support" has been and will be furnished
through the system controlled by the Electronics Supply
Office. This assignment to ESO has resulted in a
transfer of approximately 40,000 items from five in-
ventory managers to the control of the Electronics
Supply Office. After transfer, it was found that a
net saving of 34,000 items could be accomplished
since requirements of most of these items could be




The SDCPs controlled the distribution of repair parts
They did not actually store or physically distribute the
material. Inventory status information was centralized at
the SDCP on the basis of Consolidated Stock Status Reports
submitted by the supply depots and major repair activities.
The number of items under the control of an SDCP was of such
a magnitude that they had to be separated into groups of
items having similar characteristics such as item demand for
efficiency in management. A code was assigned to the item
stock number to indicate whether it was "fast-moving" or
"slow-moving, " for example. Other codes indicated whether
the item was universally stocked and if special controls had
been placed on its issue. In addition, inventories were
segregated into broad groupings based on the purpose for
which held. These over-all purposes were current operating
stock, mobilization reserve, and excess. The assignment of
7 Ibid., p. 28.
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these codes was, as a rule, based on the "dollar activity"
of the transactions involving these items. Each code pro-
vided a basis for application of different replenishment
periods and procurement techniques as well as determination
of the optimum procurement quantities. (This practice of
categorizing items on the basis of demand was another indica-
tion of the formal recognition of variations in the military
worth of an item.)
Advances in Shipboard Repair Parts Inventory Control
When the Integrated Supply System went into effect,
shipboard repair parts were being stocked in accordance with
the requirements of the technical bureaus. Each bureau used
a different medium for making its requirements known to the
ship. These documents were known as "Allowance Lists."
They contained the technical bureaus' best estimate of the
parts required to support a given equipment. The format
differed for each technical bureau. Generally, however,
the basic information provided was siiailar. Each major
piece of equipment on the ship was identified by model
number and manufacturer. Its component parts were listed
and cross-referenced to detailed assembly plans which des-
cribed the equipment's physical features. The assembly
plans were provided separately in operating instruction
books and/or in complete sets for major ship systems. The
allowance list set forth the quantities of each repair
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part required to perform repairs that the technical bureaus
considered within the ship's capabilities, certain repair
parts were considered so vital to the operation of the ship
that they were to be carried even if their installation
could not be accomplished without the assistance of a repair
ship or a shipyard. "Usually an engineering safety factor
of at least one hundred per cent was employed to lessen the
possibility of running out of a technical item."** The re-
pair parts were provided at the same time that the basic
equipment was installed. As greater quantities of more com-
plex equipment was placed aboard ships and aircraft, the
space requirements for the larger or more numerous repair
part boxes exceeded the space available, especially in
destroyers, submarines, and large aircraft. (Most small
aircraft carried very few replacement parts.) In addition,
many equipments, particularly electronic, utilized identical
parts. This resulted in much duplication of inventories
aboard these craft. As previously indicated, the use of a
manufacturer's part number for identification, often re-
stricted the amount of information available on which to
determine interchangeability. Even after the improved iden-
tification system was introduced — the assignment of Stand-
ard Navy Stock Numbers to all repair part items — there
was little reduction in the duplicated items aboard ship.
8 Ibid ., p. 29.
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There were several reasons for this. First, repair part
boxes were packed for a specific equipment and not for a
specific ship or aircraft. If the ship had a multiple in-
stallation of identical equipments it would receive one
repair parts set for each unit. Secondly, each ship main-
tained several repair parts systems which coincided with the
organization in the shore establishment. Repair parts were
usually under the custody of the division or department
Q
responsible for the maintenance of the associated equipment. 9
Often, even if interchangeability could be established, the
needs of the department dictated the duplication.
Several approaches were initiated to eliminate or
reduce these areas of duplication. When the ship's equip-
ment list contained multiple units of the same equipment the
allowance of repair parts was reduced by providing a com-
plete set of repair parts of the initial unit only and
providing other complete sets for only a portion of the addi-
tional units. This "portion" was determined on the basis of
the importance of the unit to the operability of the ship
and the probability of more than one unit being disabled at
9 At this point it is considered important to remind
the reader that these systems were designed to coincide with
shipboard departmental responsibility assignments and adhered
to the basic military policy of assuring that each commander
has control of his logistic support. This policy is as old
and deep founded as the military organizational structure it-
self. It is often considered to exist only on the command
level, but even the individual foot soldier's equipment pack
has been influenced by it.
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the same time. Military worth was once again an element
in the requirements decision.
Perhaps the most significant development from the
point of view of its far-reaching effect on current repair
parts systems was the discarding of the repair part boxes in
favor of centralised bin or drawer storage. The requirement;
determination base shifted from the individual unit to a
grouping of like equipments. The foremost proponent of this
approach was the Electronics Supply System. The duplicity
of items common to the needs of all electronic systems,
space limitations, and cost all contributed to the birth of
this development.
Duplication still existed in the shipboard repair
parts organization. In recognition of this the Coordinated
Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL) Program was established
in December 1956. 10 The major objectives of this program
were:
1. Development of Standard Allowance List Format.
The various allowance list sections were to be
published in standard format in order to increase their
universal understandability and to allow their preparation
and maintenance by mechanized processes.
2. Centralized Storage of Shipboard Allowance List
Materials.
10 U„S., Navy Department, office of Chief of Naval
Operations, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 4441.4 of 20 December 1956.
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All repair parts carried on each ship were to be
"bin-loaded .
"
3. Consolidation of Requirements.
The most important objective of the COSAL pro-
gram was the consolidation of requirements of the various
repair parts systems on board ship. This consolidation was
now possible due to the inception of the Program Support and
Supply Support concept. Although it required the transfer of
the allowance list publication responsibility from the tech-
nical bureau to the SDCPs, the responsibility for the deter-
mination of requirements was to remain with the technical
bureau.
Other Areas of Improvement
Change is inherent in the order of things. In-
sofar as the forces which it is designed to support
change, logistics must change. As far as possible,
logistics must anticipate the changes necessary to
achieve the support requirement. In this sense,
logistics is always a " problem" - how to change to
meet actual or anticipated requirements of the
supported forces. During the evolution of the Navy
the logistic support system has been adopted to
meet the developments of the day. The changes from
the ram to the gun, from the smooth-bore cannon to
the rifled cannon, from sail to steam, from coal to
oil, have been described in turn as revolutions.
By comparison with the changes taking place today,
and the rate of change, these earlier developments
appear in retrospect to have a somewhat lesser
stature
.
At no time in the Navy's history has the challenge
to adapt to change been so great as it is today. A
former Secretary of the Navy has stated the nature of
the current problem. "The Navy is presently going
through the most tremendous change it has ever under-
gone, it is passing from steam to nuclear power,
18
from gunpowder to nuclear weapons, from guns to
guided missiles, and in the air from propeller-
type planes to supersonic planes, all at the same
time." Undoubtedly, the emphasis in this state-
ment should be placed on the last phrase, "...
all at the same time." Here lies the substance of
today's demand for adaptability in the supply
support organization.
The ten year period following the inception of
the " Integrated" Supply System has witnessed tech-
xiological advances which have revolutionized the
basic concepts of warfare. This same technological
progress has introduced elements of strategy,
tactics, and logistics, which were undreamed of
earlier. Responsiveness of the supply support sys-
tem becomes an increasingly complex task in view
of developments such as the wide dispersal of the
Fleet, the current emphasis of mobility and in-
stantaneous retaliatory capability, the complexity
and high cost of equipments and materials, and the
increasing dependence on engineered systems. The
ever-accelerating rate at which new equipments are
being installed has vastly increased the range of
backup parts required to support the Fleet and the
aircraft squadrons and further necessitates a
tailored, tightly-controlled, flexible, distributive
system.^
The review of the growth of the Navy's repair parts
system up through the introduction of the COSAL program
emphasized the organizational changes which had been made.
During this same period it was determined that the logistic
support to be furnished by the Navy Supply System also
necessitated adjustments and improvements in requirement
forecasting, allowance determination, stock distribution,
management policy and control techniques other than those
already mentioned. Common to all these areas was the need
for a review of data collection, transmission and utilization
•^U.S., Navy Department, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, Supply Support of the Navy
,
(NAVSANDA Publication
340; 15 September 1957).
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The following summarization of the efforts that have been
directed to some of these problems is pertinent to purpose
12
of this dissertation:
A. Improvement in Forecasting of Material Require-
ments.
Improvement in the capability of the Navy Supply
System accurately to forecast requirements for material has
been found to be the most important element necessary for
the continued success of the System in meeting its modern
mission. In the area, the Navy is working on the develop-
ment of a single usage-data collection system, to satisfy all
supply system needs; a system which will place a minimum
burden on tha fleet. Steps are being taken toward the com-
pletion of realistic and comprehensive population-data
programs at the SDCPs. The Navy is looking to research,
(advanced mathematics and improvement in statistical tech-
niques) for over-all improvement in the entire area of con-
sumption forecasting.
B. Better Balance in Items and Quantities Carried
Aboard Ship
The current emphasis on fleet mobility and retalia-
tory capability has focused attention on the control of
afloat endurance, and the fact that the latter is dependent
on the coordinated development of more scientifically
12U.S., Navy Department, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, Supply Support of the Navy
,
(NAVSANDA Publication
340; 15 September 1957), pp. 40-43.
20
prepared allowance lists. The Navy is working on coordinat-
ing the development of these allowance lists between the
technical bureaus and the "supply" bureau. It has been
recognized that allowance list preparation is no less a
problem of stock distribution in response to a forecast of
consumption than is the problem of determining range and
depth of stocks to be carried ashore. Furthermore, since
allowance list material must be considered as a pool of con-
sumption stocks, the necessity of achieving an interdependent
and compatible relationship between these stocks and the
backup replenishment stocks is evident. The Navy is working
on several programs for unified integrated allowance lists
for ships.
C. Tailored Distribution Concepts
The basic "echeloned" nature of Navy distribution
has been discussed. Greater recognition must be given to
the fact that consumer stock levels (including allowance
list material) must be considered as a phase of the distri-
bution process, and consequently inter-related to the stock
levels at the replenishment activities. Too frequently, the
Navy is uneconomically pyramiding the stocking of low-demand
insurance technical items at all distribution levels. The
ultimate decision on stock positioning in an echeloned distri-
bution system must be based on full consideration of such
factors as demand characteristics, military essentiality,
21
cost data, and the availability and utilization of rapid
transportation and communication media.
The systematic development of automatic data communi-
cation networks and the availability of premium transporta-
tion make possible the rapid passing of action on any supply
request. This ability can go far in substituting for wide
distribution, without loss in effectiveness or economy. Dur-
ing the summer of 1956, the Aviation Supply Office was linked
by a transceiver network to its important primary stock
points. On 1 October 1956, project FAST (Fleet Air Support
Test) went into effect in the Atlantic Fleet to test the
feasibility of increased use of air transportation to supply
these sporadic-demand technical items to an active fleet.
The success of this program has increased logistic effect-
iveness.
Vulnerability is one of the most serious problems
confronting the Navy Supply System in this atomic age. A
great portion of the Navy's stocks are positioned in prime
target areas. Those are generally in coastal areas, which
are among the leading industrial, population, harbor and rail
centers of the United States. This problem of vulnerability
of stocks is receiving the increased attention it merits.
D. Simpler and Faster Service to the Customer
Today a customer still must type out a requisition,
and wait an appreciable time while that requisition is
22
processed before he gets his material. All manner of means
is being sought and tested for simplifying the "demand"
phase and the internal handling of paperwork at all distri-
bution outlets. For certain commodities the fleet is re-
quisitioning entirely by merely marking quantities on pre-
punched accounting machine cards.
E. Improved Evaluation of Cost and Other Factors
In the past "military necessity" was used as an over-
riding consideration to all cost factors in certain logistic
decisions. Adequate attempts had not been made to isolate
and evaluate "military value." Differentiation and measure-
ment of the various elements of cost, such as "cost to pur-
chase, " "cost to distribute," "holding cost" and "cost of
movement," have not been adequate. In the interest of im-
proved decision-making, the Navy is taking advantage of
modern scientific techniques to weigh properly these various
factors.
F. Measurement of System Effectiveness and Control
The Navy Supply System can be described as one where-
in control is centralized in the Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts and the inventory managers, but where operations
are decentralized to units of the distributive system. The
ability to control decentralized operations depends upon the
availability of management statistics which measure the
responsiveness or effectiveness of the System to operational
23
requirements, and the efficiency of the internal operation.
The development of controls to accomplish this is a task of
great complexity. The Navy is working to develop objective-
standards to a much greater degree in this area. The
clarification of the cost factors mentioned in the paragraph
above is part of the solution, including a measurement of
the effectiveness of consumer stock levels. The Navy is
striving to complete its statistical coverage of system
operations.
G. Better Procedures for Inventory Control
The Navy is seeking the best use of modern work-
and-time savers, such as automatic data processing and fast
data transmission. As has been stated previously, the
problems of data collection, transmission, and processing,
are common to all of the problem areas. In none of these
is a better solution more urgent than in inventory control
.
In a system of one million plus items, involving tens of
millions of transactions yearly, the difficulty of report-
ing a stock position at any given time should be obvious.
The increasing use of improved automatic data processing
equipment offers the only hope of obtaining inventory posi-
tions more quickly and accurately. The Navy is presently
operating the latest of these equipments in both its
aviation and ships parts inventory segments, and planning to
do the same in other segments as quickly as possible.
CHAPTER II
THE COORDINATED SHIPBOARD ALLOWANCE
LIST PROGRAM: AN EVALUATION
Progress is painful. Improvement requires change.
One change leads to another. Continuous change can lead
to confusion, disorganization, loss of direction and,
inevitably, disagreement. During the years immediately
following the establishment of the COSAL program a growing
need for a complete evaluation of the results of all the
changes that had accompanied this program was developing
.
The Supply Availability Program, initiated to assist ships
"in the purification and adjustment of on-board stocks and
records to bring them into conformance with prescribed al-
lowances or other stockage objective criteria, " brought
to light many deficiencies in the entire repair parts sys-
tem. In addition, during this same period a new dimension
was being added to naval warfare and to the naval mission.
The polaris missile firing, nuclear powered submarine,
U.S.S. GEORGE WASHINGTON, was being rapidly readied for
sea. To exploit this new dimension to the fullest, the
latest techniques and developments in logistic support were
U.S., Navy Department, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, BUSANPA INSTRUCTION 4441, 3A , 4 January 1960.
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utilized. Without adequate repair part support the combat
value of this modern weapon would be jeopardized. Complex
electronic detection, guidance, fire control and communica-
tion systems were being installed on many ships. More than
ever the system for repair part support needed to be capable
of supporting the means for "push-button" retaliation. For
this condition to be met, the system had to be effective,
efficient and proven by peacetime utilization, and had to
exist NOW.
The United States Navy, being the dynamic organiza-
tion that it is, was not content with the system in being.
By early 1961 the Navy had substantially completed the con-
version to the COSAL. Deficiencies still existed. In
February 1961, the Policy Advisory Council of the Bureau of
Supplies and Accounts met to consider this allowance list
program, its objectives, and the progress that had been made
toward the accomplishment of these objectives. Membership
of this group consisted of those senior officers whose
assignments placed them in a position of responsibility for
that portion of the Navy's logistic support represented by
allowance documents. Since the principal items covered by
allowance lists are repair parts, much of the material pre-
sented at this meeting is pertinent to the development of
2the subject matter of this paper.
2Much of the material in this chapter was taken from
the formal presentation prepared and presented by the
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Scope of the Fleet Allowance Program
Shipboard allowance lists are important as an ef-
fective tool for shipboard supply management. Of key
importance is their effect on the endurance capability of
our operating forces. Allowance lists serve as guides for
accomplishment of the initial outfitting of newly com-
missioned ships, as technical documents as well as supply
documents for inventory management afloat, and as ^pur only
available measure of a ship's supply readiness. Moreover,
the criteria and policies which govern the construction of
shipboard allowance lists have an extensive influence on
many other actions of the supply system at the shipboard,
fleet commander, stock point, inventory manager and tech-
nical bureau level. Allowance decisions have a direct or
indirect impact on many functions such as provisioning, pro-
curement, budgeting, transportation, fleet funding, invest-
ment levels, shipboard storage and record keeping, and
packaging and preservation.
officers and civilians assigned to the FLEET OPERATIONS
DIVISION of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. Permission
was given to use this material for the purposes set forth
herein. The data have been reduced, reorganized and is pre-
sented in a manner considered more suitable for our purposes
A consciencious attempt was made to avoid distortion and
"quoting out of context." Where exact duplication exists,
it is considered to be in the interests of accuracy and
emphasis. Where reference to other sources is. pertinent,
appropriate footnotes appear. Reference to the formal pres-
entation, which has not been published, would be repetitive
and redundant, as would an attempt on our part to duplicate
this author itive and objective analysis.
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What is the total investment represented by allowance
type material afloat and ashore? Below is a graphic pres-
entation revealing the distribution of the repair parts
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NAVY REPAIR PART INVENTORY DISTRIBUTION
Considering only secondary items under BUSANDA management
cognizance, excluding R cog items, shipboard allowance
lists represent approximately 110 million dollars of
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material. This segment of material represents the fleet
commander's first echelon of support. Materials in the
second echelon of support, which include our tender, repair
ship and AKS (supply ship) loads, is valued at approximately
58 million dollars. Our systems stocks ashore, including
material for support of the fleet and for support of the
shore establishment, total approximately 2 billion dollars
excluding "R" cognizance material. It is evident that the
decisions which go into the construction of our shipboard
allowance lists can have a significant impact not only on
the volume and composition of the materials in our mobile
logistic support forces, and in our supply system stocks
ashore, but also in the effectiveness of the support that
these stocks provide.
A brief look at the dollar value of investment repre-
sented in allowance list materials on board specific types
of ships is now appropriate
.
The USS SEA FOX, a conventional submarine, carries
over 6000 items valued at $93,000. A MIDWAY class carrier
carries 28,800 allowance list items (exclusive of R cog)
valued at $917,000. A DDR, the USS FECHTELER (DDR-870)
,
carries over 15,000 items valued at almost a quarter million
dollars. Our first fleet ballistic missile submarine, the
USS GEORGE WASHINGTON, dramatically exemplifies the changing
trend in scope of support to be provided afloat. The
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SSBN 598 carries about 25,000 items valued at one and a half
million dollars I
Charts one through four on pages 81 through 84 depict
the volume and dollar value of spare parts carried aboard
various types of submarines and ships. After viewing these
figures one can appreciate the scope of the allowance list
problem.
Objectives Set Forth by the Chief of Naval Operations
The basic purpose of the COSAL program as set forth
by the Chief of Naval Operations is to "enhance the endurance
3
of the operating Forces." It is CNO's desire that our ships
will have a maximum built-in endurance of allowance list
items to enable ships to perform their missions independent
of outside logistic support. The degree of support to be
provided for the various categories of material is based
upon the concept of obtaining a uniform duration of support
for the numerous equipments involved. To achieve this ob-
jective, our allowance lists must be (1) responsive to
changes in shipboard equipments and must accurately reflect
changes in the range and depth of support material. The
need for closer Navy-wide coordination in the program re-
quires that (2) allowance lists be standardized, both to
format and content. As a prerequisite to standardization
of content, a (3) uniform system of usage data collection
3U.S., Navy Department, Office of Chief of Naval
Operations, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 4441.4 of 20 December 1956.
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needs to be developed and implemented to assist in deter-
mining the range and depth of repair parts to be included
on shipboard allowance lists. As a further (or alternate)
means of refining the contents of shipboard allowance lists,
(4) a means of determining the relative military worth or
military essentiality of equipments and repair parts needed
to be developed and implemented. Finally, because of space
constraints aboard many types of ships, (5) the Navy's
program for conversion to "bin-drawer" stowage was to be
extended to all categories of repair parts carried on ships
of the active fleet.
To assist in the accomplishment of these objectives,
the following guidance was provided by the Chief of Naval
Operations:
(1) Allowance lists will be based on wartime need.
(2) The range (variety) of items will take
precedence over depth (quantity of an indi-
vidual item)
.
(3) Shipboard allowances will take into consider-
ation specific data such as weight, cube and
endurance loading characteristics (shelf life)
of individual items.
(4) The items included in allowances will, except
for special cases authorized by CNO, be
within the capability of the ship's force to
install.
(5) In recognition of the requirement for a period
during which actual shipboard stocks can be
brought into agreement with newly prescribed
allowances, active fleet ships will be granted
supply availability periods normally as an
extension of the ship's regular overhaul period
.
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Designated shore establishment activities
will assist the ship's force to accomplish
complete "purification" of shipboard repair
parts inventories, including offloading of
excesses, requisitioning of deficiencies,
updating of inventory control records and
actual endurance loading of items susceptible
to loading under this concept.
It is essential to recognize that implementation of
the program is to be achieved through coordinated action and
that the development of allowance lists is to be in con-
formance with the following requirements:
(1) Allowance lists are to serve as technical
documents to describe and establish mandatory
quantities of on board equipments, equipage
and directly supporting materials (including
repair parts)
.
(2) Allowance lists are to serve as supply docu-
ments to be the basis for shipboard inventory
management
.
(3) Allowance list materials are to represent the
first echelon of supply to fleet forces and,
to a large extent, will determine the duration
of independent operations by a ship.
Conclusions of Fleet Operations Division of the Bureau
of Supplies and Accounts
Probably the most important objective of the program
-
is to assure that allowance lists are effective. Although
the COSALs have answered the need for a standard, uniform
document and represent a significant advantage over their
predecessors, they do not automatically guarantee a better
quality allowance list. To be effective allowance lists must
be responsive to ships' equipment changes and reflect fleet
-
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experience in the use of repair parts and related materials.
It was intended that particular emphasis be exerted toward
achieving a goal of completely responsive, effective allowance
lists. Toward this end the basic instruction provides the
following criteria as guidance in determining the range and
depth of a ship's allowance:
Material will be limited to items necessary to main-
tain essential equipment operable and be within the capa-
bility of the ship's force to install.
Weight and cube of items must be considered in light
of ship's weight and space limitations.
Practicability of meeting every contingent require-
ment dictates that "need" rather than "desire" will
govern
.
Range of allowed items is more important than depth
of allowances.
Allowances shall support wartime needs.
When accomplishments under the objective of effective-
ness are gauged against the guidelines and within the specific
criteria provided by CNO, the results are less than accept-
able. Weaknesses may be summarized thus:
a. Responsiveness to ship's equipment changes and
fleet usage experience is in some instances
totally lacking; in others the reaction is slow
and untimely.
b. Fleet equipment validation is, at times, in-
complete, inaccurate and/or untimely.
c. Communications among or between fleet units,
bureaus and inventory control points are weak.
d. Data elements are not available or not de-
veloped. Many voids exist in availability
or development of data to comply with criteria
requirements; e.g., weight, cube, maintenance
codes, military worth and usage data.
e. Type of operations supported varies among
inventory control points. Wartime support
is not provided by all allowances.
It has been claimed that one of the logical objec-
tives of the program is to establish a uniform procedure for
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the collection of shipboard usage data on both insurance and
repetitive use items. Experience in truth, has no substitute;
therefore data reflecting actual shipboard use of material
is one of the prime factors in assisting allowance preparing
activities in updating allowance lists.
Progress on this phase of the shipboard allowance
list program has been expensive, slow and ineffective.
Another significant objective of the program is a
requirement for a determination of the relative importance
of equipments and repair parts as they relate to the success-
ful accomplishment of assigned missions by ships operating
independent of outside logistics support. CNO directed that
this determination of military worth would be developed and
that allowance lists would provide automatic information on
the relative military importance of allowed items. Military
worth is described as a value reflecting the effects of parts
shortages on a ship's tactical capability, in arriving at
this value for any part, two factors are to be considered,
(1) equipment essentiality which measures the effect of
equipment failures on the ship's ability to execute its
assigned mission, and (2) part essentiality which measures
the effect of part failure on the operability of the parent
equipment.
Last for discussion, but obviously not the least
important, is the dual objective of endeavoring to assure
that operating ships are endurance loaded and that all
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shipboard essential equipments have equal support. CNO re-
quires that each ship have a maximum built-in endurance of
allowance list items to enable the ship to. perform its
mission independent of outside logistic support. This self-
support is not to be in balance but rather shall reflect
uniform duration of support for all equipments.
CNO promulgated, for guidance, a definition of en-
durance loading, i.e., that process of selecting items
having low cost, weight, cube and nondeteriorative charac-
teristics and establishing stockage objectives for these
items at levels to cover expected usage during the normal
period between overhauls. The concept of endurance loading/
balanced support requires that each allowance item be ap-
propriately identified as to one of four types, i.e., a
consumable, an insurance item, a repetitive use item subject
to endurance load or repetitive use item not subject to
endurance load. Further, balanced support connotes that all
the allowance list preparing activities develop range and
depth of allowances to provide uniform duration of support.
Several data elements applicable to allowances are necessary
to implement desired action under this objective, i.e.,
usage rates, weight, cube, military worth and deteriorative
qualities. Further, data on shipboard stowage capacity for
each material cognizance must be available to the allowance
preparing activities.
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To effectively implement this segment of the allow-
ance list program known deficiencies must be removed. These
are:
1. Varying interpretations of the letter and intent
of the CNO objective.
2. The unilateral preparation of allowance lists.
No single activity has cognizance over the total
allowance list package for a ship. Balanced
support, therefore, is difficult if not impossible
to attain.
3. Item data is not available precluding the identi-
fication of allowance items as to their endurance
load characteristics.
4. Equipment and parts have not been assigned mili-
tary worth codes. Until this action is accom-
plished conceivably ships may be endurance loaded
with non-essential material.
S umraary
Many problems still exist; progress is painful;
progress is slow; progress is necessary. The COSAL program
has many facets and it is only one small segment of the entire
logistics problem. It required four years to implement and
at the end of that time, it was already outdated in many
respects. The objectives are sound. The approach was dic-
tated by the very magnitude of the effort. Its success must
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be judged in the light of the positive accomplishments and
the changing conditions with which it was confronted. During
this period the Navy consisted of some eight hundred ships —
ships that were mobile, ships that had missions to perform.
Logistics provides support; the tail does not wag the dog.
When one is firing at a moving target, he must "lead"
it. Requirements must be determined in advance; past usage
data are helpful but are limited to those areas where experience
exists. Throughout the previous chapters reference has been
made to military worth and military essentiality. The next
several chapters will concentrate on this concept for deter-
mining repair part allowances.
CHAPTER III
DEVELOPMENT OF AN APPROACH TO THE UTILIZATION
OF MILITARY ESSENTIALITY
Objective of the Coordinated Shipboard Allowance
List (COSAL) Program
Because the effectiveness of the shipboard allowance
list so strongly influences the combat readiness of naval
ships, it has been a subject of great importance to the Navy
in recent years. The application of scientific techniques
to inventory policy has gained wide attention, and parti-
cular emphasis has been laid on research aimed at developing
better stock level policies, thereby increasing the supply
endurance of combatant ships. There has been considerable
interest in maximizing the capability of combatant ships
for operating independent of external supply and repair
support
.
It was toward the accomplishment of this objective
that the Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL)
Program was established in December 1956; its basic objec-
tive was to enhance the endurance of the operating forces
.
Towards this end, a basis for determining the relative
^enicoff, Marvin and Henry Solomon, Toward the
Formulation and Solution of the Allowance List Problem
,
George Washington University Research Project, Serial
T-84/58 (21 May 1958), p. 1.
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military importance of equipments and repair parts as they
relate to the successful accomplishment of assigned missions
by ships and aircraft independent of outside logistic sup-
port had to be established.
The first application of this program was to be in
the development of coordinated shipboard allowance lists.
The application to aviation equipment and repair parts
allowance lists, not a part of the COSAL program, was to
be subsequently explored. Further application was to be
made to broader inventory management areas, including such
functions as procurement, provisioning, the determination of
system stock levels, disposal decisions, preparation of
2
critical item lists, etc.
Introduction of Military Worth Considerations
In order to advance the objective of the COSAL
program, the George Washington University Logistics Research
Project and the Advanced Supply System, Research and Develop-
ment Division of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts initiat-
ed an allowance list study on submarines in June, 1957.
An analysis of usage data from twelve sample sub-
marines pointed out the necessity for developing an approach
to the utilization of military worth, or essentiality,
evaluations in the problem area. This study revealed that
2
U.S. Navy Department, OPNAV Instruction 4423 .1 of
17 March 1960, (Military Worth (Essentiality) ProgramTT"
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approximately seventy-five percent of the installed tech-
nical items showed zero movement by each individual submarine
over a four-year period. Of the items which did move, more
than seventy percent were demanded only one time over these
four years. The problem was further complicated by the
lack of repetitive movement; for any one ship, less than one per-
cent of the technical items used in the four-year period
were used in every one of the four years. The problem thus
resolved itself into the development of a method for treat-
ing those items which have shown zero usage in the past,
but which may move in the future. More particularly, there
was concern with pinpointing that segment of the ship's
repair part population which is vital to the ship's existence
independent of the past history or usage . Shipboard storage
constraints, particularly critical in the case of submarines,
and budgeting considerations are factors which influence
3this concern in the face of the usage pattern.
While it has been recognized for some time that sone
concept and measurement of military worth is necessary for
inventory systems, this need became pressing in the light of
observed characteristics of demands for repair parts. Tha
results obtained from the above analysis pointed out the
immediate necessity for developing a feasible and operational
JSolomon, Henry, Joseph P. Fennell and Marvin
Denicoff, A Method for Determining the Military Worth of
Spare Parts
, George Washington University Logistics Research
Project, Serial T-82/58 (April 1958), pp. 1-2.
41
4
approach to military worth.
Approach to the Allowance List Problem:
The U.S.S. TIRU Study
On the basis of the analysis of usage data of the
twelve sample submarines , a decision was made to obtain
worth estimates for the total component and part population
range of a single combatant ship. The submarine, U.S.S.
TIRU (SS 416), was chosen for this purpose. While the study
was primarily directed at developing a measure of military
worth (essentiality) which can be used as one of the several
parameters in the determination of shipboard stock levels,
the most important objective was to determine the feasibility
of obtaining a relative measure of the seriousness of repair
parts systems. Questionnaires developed for this purpose
represent a first attempt at achieving what is basically a
relative ranking of the importance of repair parts based on
the essentiality of parts to components, and of components
to the mission of the ship. Evaluations were obtained for
approximately 1,300 components and approximately 31,600
repair part applications for these same components. Three
independent evaluations were obtained for each component and
two independent evaluations were obtained for the parts.
Denicoff, Marvin, Joseph P. Fennell, and Henry
Solomon, "Summary of a Method for Determining the Military
Worth of Spare Parts, " Naval Research Logistics Quarterly
,
NAVEXOS P-1278, Vol. 7, No. 3, (Sept. 1960), p. 221.
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A principal goal of the above study, as stated
earlier, was to develop allowance list techniques which
maximize the independent afloat endurance of combatant ships.
Independent afloat endurance refers to the capability of
ships to accomplish tactical missions independent of reli-
ance on external supply support. The importance of the
maximization of independent operation derives from the thesis
that our retaliatory power in the event of enemy attack is
significantly dependent upon the degree of self-sufficiency
attained by the operating fleet.
*
Military Worth (Essentiality) Evaluations Defined
In this context, military worth, or essentiality, is
defined as a relative ranking system which measures the ef-
fects of material shortages on a ship's capabilities. Two
factors which influence the seriousness of a particular
shortage are "mission effect, " which measures the effects
of the inoperability of specific items of equipment on the
ship's capability for accomplishing its assigned mission;
and "maintenance potential, " which measures the effect of
part failures on the operability of a parent component.
Where such failures render the parent component inoperable,
the "maintenance potential" factor considers the capability
of the ship's force, in the event of a repair parts shortage,
5Solomon, et al., A Method for Determining the
Military Worth of Spare Parts , ii.
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to maintain the parent component in a satisfactory operable
condition through on-board manufacture of the required part,
through cannibal ization, or by the employment of jury-
rigging procedures.
Combining the factors "mission effect" and "mainte-
nance potential "permits a relative evaluation of the serious-
ness of repair part shortages. For example, a repair-part-
military-worth scale is conceived which includes the ex-
tremes, "high" military worth, and "low" military worth.
At the one extreme - high military worth - the "mission ef-
fect" factor states that the inOperability of the equipment
would necessitate termination of the mission; the "maintenance
Potential" factor states that part failure renders the parent
component inoperable, the required part is not available, and
cannibalization and jury-rigging procedures are infeasible.
At the other extreme - low military worth - the "mission ef-
fect" factor states that inoperability of the equipment would
have a negligible effect on the accomplishment of the mission;
the "maintenance potential" factor states that the parent
component will continue to operate satisfactorily without
the necessity of replacing the failed part, or, should re-
placement be desired, on-board manufacture, cannibalization,
or jury-rigging procedures are feasible.
Determinination of spare part essentiality, then, is
a combination of both factors - "mission effect" and "main-
tenance potential." This is most evident when thought of
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in terras of repair parts with similar design character-
istics or a single repair part with multiple equipment
applications. The military worth of similar repair parts
will vary considerably if one is installed in a parent com-
ponent with a low mission effect. Likewise, the military
worth of similar repair parts installed in different parent
components having the same mission effect will vary if the
maintenance potential factor is high for one application
;md low for the other
.
Therefore, in making repair part military worth
estimates, two separate decisions are involved: a deter-
mination of "mission effect, " which is a command decision,
;
:
.nd a determination of "maintenance potential," which
L-hould be a decision by personnel with appropriate techni-
cal skills. 6
Procedure Used to Obtain Military Worth Evaluations
For the allowance list study, a typical war-time
situation for a fleet-type submarine of the U.S„S. TIRU
class was prescribed. The assumptions were:
(1) The submarine was to go on a patrol in a
specified area for a period of sixty days. The mission of
this patrol was to seek out and sink any enemy shipping.




(2) While on patrol duty, because of the area of
operations, it was expected that the submarine would be
submerged an average of eighteen hours each day. The sub-
marine would be snorkeling the necessary amount of time.
(3) It was to be expected that, during the sixty-
day period of operations, no supply replenishment could be
made for installed items. In addition, no repair support
would be available from tenders, repair ships, or shore
activities.
The questionnaires used in the study were designed
to obtain separate evaluations for the two factors,
"mission effect" and "maintenance potential" for the total
component and repair part population range. Agreement
was reached to obtain three independent evaluations for
each parent component and two independent evaluations for
each repair part. Component and repair part listings for
recording the military-worth evaluations were prepared from
population data decks supplied by the cognizant Supply
Demand Control Points.
The "mission effect" (component) questionnaire
described four situations which may result from the failure
of a particular component. These range from component
failure necessitating termination of the patrol action, to
failures which introduce high- or moderate-risk factors in
the accomplishment of the mission, to failures which have
a negligible effect. These situations, or effects, were
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coded numerically: 1, 2, 3, or 4, respectively. The
participant determined which situation applied for each
component in the study. Decisions were recorded in appli-
cable code numbers on the component listings.
A code 1 decision (termination of patrol action)
indicated a component failure, the seriousness of which
would cause the ship to break-off the patrol and immedi-
ately return to port for repairs. A code 2 decision (high
risk) indicated a failure which would introduce a calcu-
lated risk into the accomplishment of the mission, the
risk being restrictive in terms of operational capability
of the ship. Depending on the type of component which had
failed, limitations such as choice of areas of operation,
selection of targets, reduced defense capability, etc.
might apply. The ship, however, would stay on station.
A code 3 decision (moderate risk) indicated a failure which
imposed a much less serious restriction on the accomplish-
ment of the mission and wherein the component failure could
often be compensated for; for example, by substitution of
manual for mechanical operation. A code 4 decision
(negligible risk) indicated a failure which imposed no
restrictions on the accomplishment of the mission.
In cases where there were multiple quantities of
particular components installed on the ship, the military
worth evaluation would vary with the quantity installed.
For example, where four components were installed, if all
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four failed, the military worth evaluation code would be
1; if three failed, the military worth evaluation code
would be 2; etc.
The "maintenance potential" questionnaire listed a
series of five questions to be answered "true" or "false."
An affirmative answer to any one of the questions had the
effect of mitigating the seriousness of the shortage.
Question 1 had to do with the capability of the
ship's force for making the installation of the required
part. The remaining questions, predicated on an assumption
of a part failure with no repair part in stock, had to do
with the possibility of employing alternative resources
for keeping the parent component operative for the stipu-
lated sixty-day patrol period. Question 2 listed on-board
manufacture of the required part as an alternative solution
to the shortage problem. Repair capability of a damaged
part is implied in the question, but is not explicitly
listed. The large variety of damage possibilities pre-
cluded the use of the question in an explicit manner.
The third question dealt with the possibility of
jury-rigging; the fourth question described a situation
wherein the component would continue to operate satis-
factorily despite the failure of the repair part under
consideration, a situation representing the least serious
type of failure; and the fifth, and final, question treated
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the possibilities for cannibalization as an alternative
7
solution to the shortage problem.
The "mission effect" and "maintenance potential"
questionnaires are illustrated on pages 79 and 80
.
The components were divided into three general
categories: (1) mechanical and electrical, (2) elec-
tronics, and (3) ordnance. For each of these categories,
three independent answers were provided for each component
In order to arrive at a single military worth category for
each component, then, it was necessary that the three
independent answers be consolidated. In view of the ob-
served nature of consistency among the three answers, it
was decided that the use of the arithmetic mean would be
an acceptable way of accomplishing this measure.
In the valuation of parts, the five questions were
answered for each part application. All items were evalu-
ated in regard to component applications, independent of
the particular cognizant Inventory Manager. For example,
the participants at the ordnance Supply office evaluated
electronics and general stores parts installed on ordnance






, Naval Research Logistics Quarter3.y,
NAVEXOS P-I278, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 228-30.
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Results of the U.S.S. TIRU Allowance
List Study
The research group concluded that there were two
important results of the allowance list study. First was
the predominance of agreement among the independent answers
for the component and repair part questionnaires. In the
case of the components, substantial agreement among the
participants was obtained for 1,132, or 92.4 per cent of
the total number of components evaluated. Second was the
count of the numbers of components and repair parts falling
into each military worth category. Approximately three per
cent of the total number of components evaluated were
assigned to category 1; twelve per cent were assigned to
category 2; forty-three per cent to category 3; and forty-
two per cent to category 4. These findings were considered
very significant because of their marked contrast to the
widely held assumption of equal worth for all components at
all times insofar as allowance list decisions were concerned
As for the military worth of repair parts, an
average of sixty-six per cent of the parts fell into the
lower worth categories. They noted that, even with such
restricted facilities for repair work on board submarines,
twelve per cent of the technical items could be manu-
factured and/or jury-rigged. Another very significant ob-
servation was that almost thirteen per cent of the items
could fail without disturbing the operation of the parent
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component. Certainly, with space as a major constraint,
these items would have a low priority for on-board loading
considerations. The results of the evaluations of repair
parts clearly indicated that the range of technical items
vitally necessary for a vessel to fulfill its mission re-
quirements was quite limited. It appeared almost certain,
therefore, that there was strong potential for reducing the
on board range of repair parts, without jeopardizing the
readiness of combatant ships. Certainly, the use of mili-
tary worth data would afford more positive control over
the range of items for ship's allowance lists, and there
were even wider implications in the areas of procurement
and distribution, provisioning, the determination of system
stock levels, disposal decisions, the preparation of criti-
9
cal item lists, etc.
9Ibid ., pp. 227-34.
CHAPTER IV
PRESENT EFFORTS TOWARD OPTIMIZING
REPAIR PARTS PROVISIONING
The Increasing Importance of Systematic
Allowance List Formulation
The basic reason for supplying and maintaining a
shipboard repair parts inventory or allowance list is to
support strategic plans. These plans include the specific
current strategic plan or plans and possibly uncertain
future strategic plans. In order to insure maximum support
of these plans through shipboard inventories or allowance
lists the requirements and priorities of the imposed
strategic plans must be known or assumed. This kind of
input data has long been available in greater or lesser
detail and accuracy. It follows that the need for some
concept and quantitative measurement of military worth has
long been recognized as a necessary parameter for design-
ing effective inventory systems.
This need has become more pressing as the impor-
tance , complexity and expense of shipboard equipment has so
radically increased in the last decade. The advent of the
Fleet Ballistic Missile (Polaris) Submarines again focused
attention upon the need for a rational, quantitative
methodology to provide maximum allowance list effectiveness,
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and thereby support a maximum combat effectiveness. The
proposed operations of this class ship were well defined
with a singleness of purpose c Further, these combat ships
must operate independent of any external supply or repair
support for cruises of the order of sixty days.
The subject class of ships are submarines wherein
space has historically been a most critical problem. In
this class of vessel the space limitation would be reached
before concern would have to be given to the aggregate
weight of the items carried. In surface vessels or very
deep diving submarines, weight limitation problems would
also exist.
Optimum COSAL Research Efforts
on a Polaris Submarine
The investigative work on the USS TIRU, previously
described, provided a background for an Optimum Coordinated
Ship Allowance List Program (Optimum COSAL) for the Polaris
Submarines. The purpose of the optimum COSAL study was to
develop mathematical models or techniques for making opti-
mum allowance list range and depth determinations. The
methodology proposed by the George Washington University
Logistics Research Project under the office of Naval Re-
search Contract Nonr 761 (06) includes consideration of
military worth and any constraint which might ultimately
hj.S. Navy Department, Special Projects Office,
S.P. Instruction 5000.2 of 5 May 1960.
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2be imposed; e.g. space, weight, budget, repairability, etc.
What had primarily been a research effort up until 1960,
3became a Navy-wide program.
Major Features of Optimum COSAL
A major feature of the Optimum COSAL Program is
the provision for Navy policy control of allowance lists.
The Navy can conduct feasibility tests of an extremely
wide range of alternative policies before actually stocking
a ship in terms of a particular policy. It will also allow
the operating forces to make a final policy decision and
insure that the allowance list will reflect that decision.
Changes in equippage or tactical missions can also be
quickly integrated into existing data to generate a new
allowance list reflecting these kinds of changes. Further,
inventory managers can have information available in a
routine manner which will provide statistical information
on the distribution of unit prices and cubes, items by
essentiality ratings, and usage estimates. Allowance list
summary data available would include (1) the dollar value
of the list, (2) the storage volume requirements of the
2Office of Naval Research, Logistics and Mathemati-
cal Statistics Branch, Polaris the Optimum COSAL Program
,
A Report prepared by the office of Naval Research in Con-
junction with the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, the
Special Projects Office and the George Washington Univer-
sity, June 1961.
3U.S. Navy Department, OPNAV Instruction 4423.1 of
17 March 1960.
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list, (3) the range and depth of repair parts, (4) the
component coverage and (5) the part population coverage.
Possibly the most important feature will be the quality
control which inventory managers could exercise over the
input data from which the allowance list is generated.
The implementation of the Optimum COSAL technique
can result in significant improvements not only for logis-
tics planning but for actual operations as well. The speed
and flexibility of list generation once the requisite in-
put data has been accumulated is one of the advantages of
this approach. Allowance lists tailored to operating
policies can readily accommodate changes of policy and
input data-, Alternative policy listings can be examined
and quantitative evaluation of any chosen policy list is
possible.
Input Data Requirements
In order that the possible advantages of this opera-
tions research approach can be realized, the following
requirements must be met:
(1) Quantitative data of sufficient accuracy must
be accumulated for all of the parameters that affect the
goals of proper allowance list stocking.
(2) Quantitative and consistent goals or objectives
of shipboard repair parts allowance lists must be formu-
lated.
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(3) Mathematical models which yield a sufficiently
accurate output in terms of the stated goals when fed im-
puts of all the causative parameters must be designed.
These models must then be tested to insure their validity.
(4) Continuing evaluation of allowance lists so
generated will be necessary to insure the validity of the
input data, the model used and the goals or objectives
stipulated.
In April 1960, a program was initiated by the
Special Projects Office for allowance list research to be
directed to the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (SSB(N)598), the
4
first of the Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines. The
project was coordinated by, and under the management con-
5
trol of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. The re-
search staff was composed of the same individuals who had
conducted the previous three-year studies. Technical data
were gathered from the following sources: Ship's Parts
Control Center, Ordnance Supply Office, Electronics Supply
Office, Bureau of Ships, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts,
Polaris contractors, Submarine Squadron 14, USS GEORGE
WASHINGTON, and USS PATRICK HENRY. 6
4
U.S. Navy Department, Special Projects Office
Instruction 5000.1 of 26 March 1960.
5
U.S. Navy Department, loc. cit .
U.S. Navy Department, Special Projects Office
Instruction 5000.3 of 28 July 1960.
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The first phases of the program included the required
completion of the following support programs:
1. Acquisition of complete and accurate installed
component and equipment population data,.
2. Acquisition of military essentiality data,
3. Development of mathematical models or tech-
niques, and
4. Programming the resultant model to yield vari-
ous allowance lists.
Population Data — Acquisition of complete and accurate
listings of the installed components and equipment, the
first requirem2nt, proved more difficult than would at
first be imagined. In fact, to date, some year and one-
half later, complete and current listings of the approxi-
mately 3,500 installed components and equipment are not
yet available. Parts data including unit price, unit
cube, weight, usage estimates where practicable, etc. were
required for approximately 62,000 items. The accuracies
of these listings were of course dependent upon the in-
stalled component and equipment lists.
Essentiality Data — The requirement for military essential-
ity data necessitated the use of the previously developed
technique for making essentiality determinations. A train-
ing course in essentiality rating techniques was next re-
quired to insure consistency of essentiality data. The
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actual collection and tabulation of data was then followed
by the development of a technique for classifying the raw
essentiality information into discreet and meaningful cate-
gories.
Objective measurement and comparison of the mili-
tary essentiality on all installed equipments, components
and applicable repair parts were deemed necessary to pro-
vide inputs to spare parts allowance list formulation.
The relative ranking of the raw military essentiality data
developed a systematic grouping which measured the effects
of part failure on the capability of the total shipboard
Polaris Weapon System. - This fundamental piece of infor-
mation does not in itself provide a solution to the allow-
ance list problem. Along with other kinds of data both on
the size, price, etc. of each part; the particular operat-
ing policies, and assigned missions; an optimum solution
may be obtained.
The military worth of a particular part is based
upon a consideration of the part-to-component-to -^equipment—
to-mission relationship. The first concern is the effect
of a failure of a particular part on the operability of
its parent component. Second, if the part failure results
in a component failure, the effect of the component failure
on the parent equipment is of concern. Finally, attention
is focused upon the consequences in terms of the ship's
mission of the possible failure of the parent equipment.
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To acquire this kind of data a series of three
separate questionnaires* one for equipment, one for com-
ponents, and one for repair parts was developed and utilized
Three independent military essentiality answers for each
installed equipment and component were obtained. The
participants in this portion of the program were: the
equipment contractors, the concerned technical bureau per-
sonnel, and operating fleet personnel. Three independent
evaluations were considered necessary to provide a measure
of consistency and to point up any bias introduced by a
particular participant. In the case of the contractors,
the questionnaires were answered by design or systems en-
gineers with experience in the particular sub-system be-
ing considered. Civilian engineers were utilized in the
technical bureaus. In every case purposeful effort was
made to utilize personnel with experience and training in
the Polaris Weapons System. Questionnaires included a
statement of the assumed typical patrol requirements of
the ship. The questionnaires, when completed, provided
data as to: (1) the effect of an equipment or component
failure on the stipulated mission effectiveness of the
ship, (2) redundancy or the availability of duplication
of installed equipments and components, and (3) the
availability of alternatives or emergency methods which
could effect temporary repair and make continued opera-
tions possible. Further, part questionnaires provided
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data as to the effect of each part failure on its parent
component and whether the part was considered installable
by the ship's force.
All the above data were coded numerically. In or-
der to employ the essentiality obtained from the three in-
dependent evaluations a single military essentiality code
was required for each part application. The input data
were at least 90% consistent (two or more agreements in
all category questions) . Where there were no agreements
a majority rule was applied to consolidate the independent
source data. The consolidated part data along with the
data on its parent component and equipment was then listed
or ranked in priorities of military essentiality. The
highest ranking would refer to a particular part which
could be installed by the ship's force and is essential
to the operation of its parent component. The parent
component for this part vitally affects the operation of
its parent equipment. There is no redundancy or emergency
method available to reestablish the equipment's operability.
Finally, the failure of the parent equipment would so de-
grade the capability of the ship as to abort the mission,
there again being no redundant or alternative emergency
method available to perform the necessary function.
Part essentialities were grouped down to the low-
est rank where part, component and equipment failures have
negligible mission effect, and where redundant or alternative
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model simultaneously considers all item characteristics
of all items in light of the expected value of the item
for the ship's military mission. Both present models
employ a negative binomial distribution of future demand
probability for each repair part. This statistical dis-
tribution is utilized because of the weight of emperical
evidence gained by analyses of historical demand patterns
for moderate and high usage shipboard repair parts. Dis-
tribution of extremely low usage parts is presumed to
follow this same distribution.
Model Programming — The final aspect of the simulation
program included the preparation of various allowance
lists, each list reflective of a particular operational
gpolicy. Approximately forty different lists, each based
upon computations for the total installed population of
technical repair parts, were prepared. These were re-
duced to eighteen lists, and then to six which were con-
sidered as representative of the Optimum COSAL require-
9
ments. These lists were reflective of particular mixes
8
Interview with Herbert G. Mills, Commander, Supply
Corps, U.S. Navy, Director, Advanced Logistics Research
Division, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, December 14,1961
9Polaris, the Optimum COSAL Program , a Report Pre-
pared by the Office of Naval Research, Bureau of Supplies
and Accounts, Special Projects Office and The George
Washington University under the Logistics Research Project,
Contract Nonr761 (06) , Project NR 347 008 of June 1961.
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of operational policies, e.g., minimize essentiality
weighted shortages, minimize dollar and/or space require-
ments, maximize protection levels, etc. The six lists
were forwarded for military evaluation.
The USS GEORGE WASHINGTON has been operating for
about one year. The repair parts demand data generated
in this period indicate that the allowances generated by
the research project are more responsive and well-balanced
than the actual on-board allowance. The testing period has
not yet generated sufficient data to determine any quantita-
tive relationships between the actual and the various pro-
posed allowance lists. , Preliminary qualitative compari-
sons do now indicate that the Cardinal Model listing
would have provided fewer high military worth part short-
ages; would have required 17% less storage volume; would
have cost 10% ($2,190,000 vs. $2,430,000) less; would have
provided equal range of repair parts; and would have in-
creased depth three-fold.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary of Developments
The mission of the Navy is implicit in law and
directives of the Secretary of Defense - a continuing
responsibility to be "organized, trained, and equipped
primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to
operations at sea, ...." The mission is not changed by
technological advances; the necessity for employment of
iiaval forces remains constant. The successive employment
of the carpenter and the sail-maker, the repair part box,
and the COSAL and the development of the presently pro-
posed optimum allowance list have been necessary to support
this mission. In the historical presentation of the Navy's
progress in the management of repair parts' inventories,
the deficiencies of each former program have been enumerated,
VThat has not been emphasized is that the evolution of each
program has closely paralleled the ever-increasing trend
toward centralization of military management.
The equipment spare parts box fulfilled the needs
of the individual responsible for the maintenance of that
particular equipment. Multiple and decentralized stocking
policies created excessive duplication of parts. The lack
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of a common identification system limited inter-equip-
ment use of common parts. The Integrated Supply System
provided common identification for identicial parts and
eliminated much of the duplication of inventories in the
ashore supply depots. Shipboard inventory duplications
were still prevalent. The continuation of equipment
repair part box stowage in support of the decentralized
shipboard organization limited improvement in this area.
The COSAL program and the bin-drawer stowage program
were designed to eliminate inter-system and therefore
inter-shipboard-department duplication. Much has been
accomplished; much remains to be accomplished. Many of
the COSAL deficiencies that exist today are simply the
result of administrative lag. Most of this administrative
lag, however, is the result of the continuing decentralized
control
.
Ihe exponentially accelerating pace of scientific
and technological developments in military equipment has
had a major impact on logistic requirement determinations.
Present research includes a study of single-item require-
ments and has resulted in the development of a method-
ology for preparation of shipboard repair part allowance
lists designed to increase the military effectiveness of
combatant ships. A series of pilot allowance lists for a
nuclear-powered submarine carrying ballistic miesiles have
been designed to permit maximum endurance at sea under
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specific mission requirements. This approach has been
accepted as the most promising route to the overall
objectives of the Navy's repair parts program.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The COSAL Program
The Integrated Supply System was, at best, a
compromise'. The "marriage of the technical and supply
functions at the inventory control point" was actually
an approach that permitted the continued existence of
separate repair parts systems. The division between
"technical matters" and "supply functions" was a con-
cession to command prerogative. To further complicate
the issue, the system was, for all practical purposes,
cut off from the fleet — the ultimate user of its out-
puts. Recommendations and complaints had a long., time-
consuming path to follow. Functions and authority were
not clearly defined. Coordination between the widely
separated, interested parties was difficult due to the
inherent weaknesses in any communications system.
The COSAL program eliminates very few of these
weaknesses. At the shipboard level coordination is
improved and duplication reduced, but the control centers
(The Supply Demand Control Points, the Technical Bureaus,
the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts and the Fleet
Commanders) all retain their individual prerogatives.
Final responsibility rests with the Chief of Naval
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Operations, as it does in all military matters, but en-
forceable coordination is non-existent because of the
division of authority.
The COSAL program is not passe. It is based
upon sound principles. It is, and will be at least for
the near future, the system in being. The weaknesses can
and should be strengthened. The advent of single-managers
for common defense materials and the recently approved
Defense Supply Agency for control and coordination of
single-managers make it all the more imperative that the
Navy establish centralized control of the repair parts
systems. It is recommended that:
1. The Navy establish a single inventory con-
trol point for the management of all repair
part inventories.
2. This inventory control point be staffed with
technical supply and line (operating) personnel
3. The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Technical
Bureaus, Fleet Commanders, and the Chief of
Naval Operations delegate the authority for
allowance list requirements determinations,
preparation and management to the Commanding
Officer of this activity.
4. Direct lines of communications be established
with the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, the
Technical Bureaus, the Fleet Commanders and
the Chief of Naval Operations to promote a
free exchange of data relating to require-
ments and performance.
5. The Commanding Officer of this activity be
responsible to the Chief of the Bureau of
Supplies and Accounts for management, to the
Chiefs of the Technical Bureaus for technical
guidance, to the Fleet Commanders for
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compliance with specific shipboard re-
quirements and to the Chiaf of Naval
Operations for overall policy guidance.
Recommendation (5) above, is made with the full
recognition of the problems it will generate. The division
of responsibility will be continued. The present line and
staff organizational structure of the Navy Department re-
quires such a division. The alternative is to place the
proposed activity under the direct operational and manage-
ment control of the Chief of Naval Operations. It is
considered that this would defeat its purpose. Coordi-
nation, cooperation and control are not necessarily more
enforceable because of the higher organizational level to
which a commnd reports. Direction is needed and exists
by virtue of the responsibility and authority vested in
the chief of Naval Operations. Coordination of the
functions of all interested parties — supply, technical
and operations — must be accomplished at a level com-
mensurate with the problem. It is considered that this
can be accomplished at the organizational level proposed.
Each interested party will look to only one activity for
the accomplishment of its repair part support requirements.
This activity will be in a position not only to evaluate
the effect of these requirements on an overall system basis
but will have to consider the vested interests of all
parties in order to achieve universal acceptance of its
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actions. Acceptance is absolutely necessary if the system
is to be effective. Acceptance cannot be directed. Con-
trol must be a voluntary action at each level of the
organizational structure if it is to be achieved.
The Military Essentiality Approach
The approach to today's multifaceted shipboard
carried repair parts problem can be paralleled to Mr. Hitch's
proposed Department of Defense programming techniques. In
each case the overall problem is to maximize probable ef-
fectiveness with minimal drain on resources. Mr. Hitch's
proposed program is based on, "the establishment of na-
chinery . . . within the office of the Secretary of Defense
to consolidate , review, and analyze in a systematic manner
the programs developed by the Military Departments." The
requirement for such machinery is based upon "the great
technical complexity of modern-day weapons, their lengthy
period of development, their tremendous combat power, and
their enormous costs place an extraordinary premium on the
sound choice of major weapons systems in relation to tasks
and missions." Major problems in this proposed approach
were recognized early in its conception.
. . . much more work has to be done on the analysis
of military effectiveness. In this connection, I
would like to point out that a description of a weapon
system, no matter how many adjectives it uses, is not
a substitute for an evaluation of its military effective-
ness, in terms of the mission it is designed to perform.
Admittedly, this is a very difficult area of analysis.
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... we will have to develop a mechanism which will
permit us to make prompt program adjustments .•'.n
response to changes in the international situation,
in technology and in requirements — at any time
during the planning-programming-budgeting cycle.
Mr. Hitch has thereby indicated two major require-
ments for any planning program: ability to evaluate ef-
fectiveness and ability to sense and adjust to changes as
the program proceeds. To make sound decisions concerning
such a program, essential facts and analyses are required.
The necessary data includes: (1) alternatives available,
(2) probabilities of fixed levels of effectiveness for
each alternative and (3) the total cost of each alternative.
This is commonly referred to as the operations research
approach.
This operations research approach to determine
the underlying principles and the quantitative analysis
of the probable results of any of the infinite alternative
repair part allowance lists appears most promising „ Cen-
tralised control of allowance list formulation and decisions
is, however, alien to the time-honored precept of the
operational commander's control over his logistics support.
Before the commander will waive this prerogative he must
recognize the advantages of centralized control. He must
Remarks of the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Charles J. Hitch before the American Society of Military
Comptrollers, The Pentagon, Washington, D. C.,Sept. 21,1961.
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understand and be convinced of the validity of the method-
ologies being introduced. He must be cognizant of the
probabilistic approach, the optimization theory and the
possible individual shortages that may arise.
Scientists, mathematicians and engineers are,
today, required to combine their talents and academic
diciplines to develop the tools and strategies of future
wars. It would logically follow that the same kind of
diverse scientific investigation of the Navy logistics
problem is also now necessary. Sound rational, consoli-
dated decisions within the repair parts allowance problem
area must include logical analyses considering the follow-
ing factors:
1. The unlimited alternative repair parts load
lists possible.
2. The relative probable effectivesness of each
alternative.
3. The full cost of each alternative.
The probable effectiveness of each alternative list must be
quantitatively determinable in terms of the stipulated
military missions. The optimum Coordinated Ship's Allow-
ance List (Optimum COSAL) program is based upon such a
rational, quantitative operations research approach.
The most basic and obvious initial data required
before this systematic comparison can be commenced is a
complete and accurate part, component and equipment
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population listing. The central accumulation of such
data is not the straightforward process it would appear
to be. Decentralization of technical control of systems
and equipments to the various bureaus and delegation of
some of this authority to subordinate commands, equipment
contractors, ship builders, overhaul and repair activities
and to the ship's commanders makes retrieval of complete
population data very difficult. Further, the dynamic
nature of component and equipment replacement or modifi-
cation creates an ever-changing population listing.
To meet this problem a central data repository
for part, component and equipment population information
inust be established. It would seem consistent to locate
this repository within the data processing center which
will formulate the Optimum COSAL's.
Military worth and probable demand data must be
available in order to evaluate the relative effectiveness
of the possible repair parts load lists created from the
total population data.
The present research on Optimum COSAL for the
USS GEORGE WASHINGTON cannot be fitted directly to other
submarine classes, surface ships or aircraft designed for
multiple possible mission assignments. In order that
simultaneous consideration of all possible repair part
essentiality codes is possible, the following procedure
is recommended: Collect raw essentiality data from two
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or more independent sources relating the essentiality of:
1. The particular part to its parent component,.
2. The particular component to its parent equipment,
3. The particular equipment to each system it may
support,
4. Each particular system to the ship or unit,
5. The particular ship or unit to each mission
it might be called upon to support, and finally,
6. The importance or essentiality of each particular
mission.
An aggregate, weighted, single essentiality code for each
part could then be determined by first, separate essential-
ity coding of each of the six ratings above. These codes
could be designated: (2) for critical essentiality, (1)
for restrictiveness or risk if demand could not be ful-
filled, and (0) for minimal consequence. An aggregate
code could then be determined by noting the sequence of
the codes in each of the six ratings. Installability of
parts, redundancy and alternatives for repair can be coded
and added to the above for computer programming.
Admittedly this additional data will complicate
the problem by adding additional rankings of military
essentiality codes. Programming the computer with a
variation of the present mathematical models will be
necessary. Though the program will be increasingly com-
plex, nothing really new in approach is suggested. For a
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balanced, Navy-wide program, these additional essentiality
ratings are considered necessary.
In order that the probable demand rate can be con-
sidered with each part's essentiality code, usage data is
needed. For very slow moving repair parts the validity of
estimated usage data must be questioned. In estimating
future usage the equipment designer or system engineer is,
in fact, estimating the mean time to failure for each part
performing each particular function. The reciprocal of the
estimated mean time to failure will be an estimated demand
rate due to independent part failure.
Actual usage data for a particular part performing
a particular function will be the aggregate result of in-
dependent part failure (estimated above) and other causes.
For example, cascading failures — failures caused by mal-
functioning or failure of other associated parts, components
or equipment — may generate actual usage. Further, the
unnecessary usage caused by replacement of parts in the
attempt to localize and rectify a complex equipment mal-
function will produce usage. Shelf life or storage de-
terioration and faulty repair parts will tend also to in-
crease usage. Variations of operating environment
(temperature, humidity, vibration, power fluctuations, etc.)
will also have a bearing upon estimated part life.
The present demand estimates, to represent probable
fleet usage, should explicitly include the above factors..
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The estimates must also include statistical deviation
from the mean in order that assurance or risk can be
quantitatively evaluated.
Central accumulation of valid usage data from
fleet units and more realistic demand estimates will be
necessary input parameters to the evaluation of allowance
list effectiveness. Correlation of demand estimates and
actual usage data, and updating of future demand rates
and rate deviations will be a continuing requirement.
Another basic problem area is the assignment of
full or total costs to each of the possible allowance list
alternatives. Mr. Hitch has also recognized that "...
good total cost information is not yet available for many
of the proposed program elements." He is here referring
to total cost over the full service life of the program
element o Cost data for alternative allowance lists must
also consider the total or full cost. The idea of full
cost can be defined to include:
1. The dollar price of procuring and deliver-
ing the load list material.
2. The cost, throughout the ship or aircraft's
life, of providing for
a) Space or volume allocated to repair
parts stowage,
b) Weight and/or moment reserved for stowage,
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c) Stowage facilities to provide for
accessibility,
d) Manpower and tools necessary to permit
utilization of the load list repair parts,
e) Training expense to provide part replace-
ment and adjustment skills, and
f) The necessary consumables, berthing,
messing, sanitary and other support
facilities required by the maintenance
personnel.
Assignment of accurate dollar values for all of
these cost factors is not yet included in the Optimum
COSAL program. To be able to quantitatively analyze the
cost vs. effectiveness of any alternative allowance list
over an extended period of time will require knowledge of
all the elements that make up total cost.
General
The recommendations made herein are considered to
be consistent and complementary. The single inventory
control point would serve as the inventory manager, the
central data repository, the data processing center, the
research coordinator and the mediator of interests. The
assignment of the research function to this activity will
eliminate the duplication of data collection, reduce
communications and provide for improved understanding of
the problems that need to be considered.
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Areas for Future Consideration
A study such as this would be incomplete without
some consideration of the future. Recent research and
development work on atomic reactors and unmanned, satel-
lite-borne electronic systems should point up the
possibilities and approaches to the reduction of
maintenance. A systematic evaluation of the
advantages of this kind of approach (reduction in cost of
required repair parts, reduction in stowage volume and
weight requirements, reduction in necessary training, tools
and test equipment savings resulting from reduced mainte-
nance personnel requirements, increased equipment re-
liability, etc.) can be weighed against the additional
expense of design, test, manufacture and installation of
the more reliable equipment. With the same approach,
systems capable of self-maintenance can be evaluated.
Here equipment designed with built-in redundant elements
cross-connected by automatic switching units could provide
repair parts as an integral built-in part of the equipment.
Various compromise approaches could also be evaluated.
For example, preassembled, plug- in components is one com-
promise which enhances equipment maintainability by de-
creasing the inoperable period resulting from a part failure
and reduces the manpower, training and tools necessary to
effect a repair. Additional costs must be weighed against
these apparent advantages.
78
Evaluation of basic ship design alternatives such
as system and equipment design, general arrangement and
allocation of space, weight and moment reserves, mainte-
nance and replacement policies, duplication, redundancy
and secondary systems, future research requirements, etc.,




1. Fleet-type submarine, TIRU class.
2. Sixty-day wartime patrol.
3. Submerged 18 hours a day. Normal
snorkel ing.




In performance of the stated mission,
the component under consideration fc.il s
Repair cannot be accomplished.
Questions
T F
/~7 /T 1. Inoperability of the component would
necessitate the termination of the
patrol action.
T F
f~~7 f~7 2. Inoperability of the component would
introduce a high-risk factor in the
accomplishment of the mission.
T F
/ / /""7 3. Inoperability of the component would
introduce a moderate-risk factor in the
accomplishment of the mission.
T F
/ / /~"7 4. Inoperability of the component would
have a negligible effect on the




/ / / / 1. Replacement can be accomplished by
the ship's force.
T F
/ / / / 2 . The required replacement part can be
manufactured by the ship's force with
the machinery available on the ship.
T F
/ / / / 3. The equipment can be made to function
through known jury-rigging procedures.
No substitute spare parts are required
T F
/ / / / 4. The equipment will continue to operate
satisfactorily for the stipulated 60-
day period without a part replacement
being made and without the necessity
for jury-rigging. If there is a re-
duced efficiency, such reduction is
acceptable for the operation of the
equipment.
T F
/_/ / / 5 . The part can be removed intact (with-
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